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POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
WEST GERMANY: STATE FINANCING
OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Donald P. Kommers*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE RELATIONSHIP between political parties and representative government
has been an important consideration in the constitutional jurisprudence of the
Federal Republic of Germany. This jurisprudence forms a fascinating chapter
in the postwar development of German constitutional law, not only because
the Federal Constitutional Court has gone further than any other constitu-
tional tribunal in the West to promote a free and competitive party system, but
also because the Court's decisions affecting the status of parties under the
Basic Law, especially those having to do with party finance, are a marvelous
illustration of the interplay between politics and law. Political interests and
constitutional values could hardly become more entangled than they did in
the Federal Constitutional Court's Decision of July 19, 1966, which invalidated
a federal plan for subsidizing political parties.' It is the purpose of this article
briefly to consider this and related cases, along with their impact on the West
German political system.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Theories of Representation
In western liberal democracies political parties have not counted for much
in constitutional law. This is not really surprising since the idea of constitu-
tional government long preceded the emergence of political parties as an aspect
of the democratic process. Parties in the modern sense originated with the
extension of the franchise, serving as an efficient means for the organization of
electoral competition. But this was a political development largely beyond
This study was made possible by grants from the American Philosophical Society and
the Program of West European Studies, University of Notre Dame. I am deeply grateful
for their support of this and other studies related to the West German Federal Consti-
tutional Court.
1 20 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 56 (Tfibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul
Siebeck], 1967). (Hereafter cited as BVerfGE)
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constitutional law's concern for civil rights and the formal distribution of
powers within government. Whether parties as corporate units outside of
government flourished or languished was of little moment in western constitu-
tional theory.
Constitutional law's reticence on the subject of political parties, which
continues to this day, may be traced to certain traditional yet contradictory
notions of political representation that persist and coexist in modern constitu-
tional theory. These notions or "images" of what really happens when the
process of representation takes place are largely hostile or, at best, neutral
toward the role of parties in democratic systems. Since these theories continue
to influence judicial attitudes toward certain constitutional claims of political
parties they need briefly to be considered.
One such theory, taught by Jeremy Bentham and other early nineteenth-
century liberals, views the political system as a collection of self-seeking in-
dividuals. In support of this rather atomistic view of society Bentham himself
wrote that "individual interests are the only real interests." 2 Hence, if the
representative would only serve those individual interests the greatest good of
the greatest number somehow would result. This was one reason Bentham,
James Mill and their fellow utilitarians emphasized the importance of elec-
tions and suffrage as paths to constitutional reform.3 It was assumed that by
these means maximal correspondence between public law and public opinion
would be achieved, for individual interests could not adequately be represented
or harmonized within the framework of large groups. This individualist con-
ception of the political process suffuses United States Supreme Court decisions
proclaiming the one-man one-vote principle as the only valid basis of legislative
representation;4 it is also at the basis of the recent holding of the Italian Con-
stitutional Court that a member of Parliament cannot validly be bound on
how to vote by instructions from his party.5
Converging somewhat paradoxically with this atomistic theory is the
notion of representation as an expression of general will; that is, representatives
owe their allegiance to a will that actually transcends party, the vested interests
of social groupings and the personal interests of individuals. Thus Article 38
2 John Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co.,
1843), I, 321.
3 See Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1928), p. 259.
4 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
WMCA v. Lomenza, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964) ; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967);
Sailors v. Kent County Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112 (1967); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); and Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
5 Decision of July 7, 1964 (Nr. 72) Giurisprudenza Costituzionale (1964), p. 92.
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of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany declares that deputies
of the German Bundestag are representatives of the "whole people," subject
only to their conscience, and not bound by instructions of any kind. Even
Article 21, defining the role of parties in the German system, makes reference
to shaping the "political will of the people." The Rousseauistic tone of these
provisions is accented by the suggestion that community consensus is necessary
if public policy is really to reflect general will. Rousseau himself believed that
dissensus, like tumult and long debates, marked the ascendency of particular
interests and the end of the state.6 He would not have tolerated a regime of
political parties because by definition they divide people, create discord, and
usurp the true functions of government. He thus envisioned no instrumen-
talities mediating between people and government.
Finally, there is the corporate theory of representation. According to this
theory those groups performing distinct and necessary functions in society are
the basic units of a political system; hence these groups, not individuals sepa-
rated artificially by legislative district lines, are the true units of representation.
Represented in its most degenerate form by Fascist Italy, the "corporate state"
as such is no longer regarded as compatible with parliamentary democracy.
Nevertheless, the idea of corporate representation is still today, owing partly to
the influence of Catholic thought, expressed in European constitutions. It is
the idea that men achieve meaning and political identity as members of social,
economic, and occupational groups. The Italian Constitution, for example,
perceives the individual as a member of "social groups through which his
personality develops [and therefore requires] the fulfillment of inalienable
duties of political, economic, and social solidarity." 7 Institutional manifesta-
tions of this idea are France's Economic and Social Council, established under
Article 69 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, along with Italy's Na-
tional Council of Economy and Labor,' created by Article 99 of the 1947
Constitution.8
6Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762'trans. G. D. H. Cole, New York:
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1913), p. 92.
7 Constitution of the Italian Republic (December 22, 1947), Article 2.
8 Political theory in the United States, while rejecting functional representation as a
formal constitutional device, has been most heavily influenced by Madison's theory of checks
and balances among group interests, both at the level of government and of society. But
where European theory seems largely to assume a natural harmony among interests, Madi-
sonian theory begins with the assumption that man is basically a passionate creature and
prone to selfishness. Hence conflict among groups is natural and, as Madison put it, "essen-
tial to liberty." Such conflicts in fact need to be encouraged-"liberty is to faction what
air is to fire," said Madison-so as to create a balance of interests that would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for any one group to gain control of government. Many modern
defenses and explanations of the American political system are at root adornments of
Madisonian theory. According to the prevailing view in American academic circles, political
parties are themselves the products of group conflicts. See, for example, David Truman,
The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), pp. 262-287.
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It bears repeating that none of these theories is very congenial to political
parties. The constitutional law of the West has been written as though parties
were little more than benign intruders in the process of legislative representa-
tion. In no instance have they been regarded as constitutionally essential to
the principle of limited government. What is interesting about recent develop-
ments in German constitutional law is the effort that is being made to adjust
these traditional constitutional theories of representation with prevailing
political theory about party.
B. Parties in the German Experience
Today it is axiomatic that political parties are necessary agencies of demo-
cratic government. Leaders must be recruited, citizens consulted, issues crystal-
lized, governments organized, policies made, and laws enforced. In the
modem nation-state, with millions of voters, political parties are regarded as
the most rational and democratic means for carrying out these functions:
rational because they provide the electorate with alternative choices of policy;
democratic because they allow these choices to be made by majority rule.
Obviously, this assumes a party system that is competitive if not necessarily
dyadic. In short, parties constitute the critical linkage between people and
government, affording people the only genuine opportunity to translate their
views on political issues into public policy.
This is a liberal democratic view of the political process largely rejected by
German ideology. Since Napoleon's retreat from German soil in 1815 the
dominant thrust of Germany's political tradition, as historians ceaselessly
remind us, has been neither liberal nor democratic, but rather conservative and
authoritarian. This was not an environment that would easily nurture a system
of political parties. Actually, the intellectual and political history of Germany
reflects an antiparty bias that was reinforced by the Weimar's ruin. Yet it is
interesting to note that, though Weimar was a regime of parties, the only
mention of political parties in the Weimar Constitution was the directive
instructing civil servants to serve the state and not political parties.9 Under
the shattering impact of events that are too familiar to be recounted here the
Weimar Republic degenerated into a regime of warring factions, rendering
parliamentary government all but impossible. With the advent of Hitler,
Germany's brief experiment with democracy-and party government--came
to an end. What emerged was a totalitarian regime unmatched in violence,
fanaticism, and terror.
9 The Constitution of the German Reich (August 11, 1919), Article 130 (1)..
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C. Parties Under the Basic Law
The Weimar experience was uppermost in the minds of West Germany's
constitution-makers after World War II. One interesting feature of the Parlia-
mentary Council, which convened in 1949 to draft a new constitution for
Germany, was its complete domination by representatives of political parties,
with Christian and Social Democrats making up the large majority of dele-
gates. To create a stable regime of political parties was an objective of many
of the framers. 10 Whether this could be achieved within an antiparty civic
culture and among people psychologically unprepared to accept parties as
critical instruments of democratic government was a query that had no ready
answer. It certainly could not be achieved by constitutional fiat. Yet the
framers were not unaware of the symbolic importance of devoting an article of
the Constitution to the status and role of political parties in the new republic.
Article 21 of the Basic Law provides:
(1) The political parties participate in the forming of the political will of
the people. They must be, freely formed. Their internal organization
must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account
for the sources of their funds.
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their ad-
herents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic order or
to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the
question of unconstitutionality.
(3) Details will be regulated by Federal legislation.
It is difficult to say, however, which of the first two sections of Article 21 was
more important to the framers. Was the Article occasioned more by fear of
internal subversion than by the desire constitutionally to legitimate political
parties? Whether section two was originally a' qualification of section one or
the other way around did not, in any case, obscure the fact that these pro-
visions could be used to promote a regime of parties. Constitutional law was
one tool immediately seized upon for this purpose.
20 For the historical background to Article 21 see Hermann von Mangoldt, Dos Bonner
Grundgesetz (Berlin and Frankfurt: Verlag Franz Vahien GbmH, 1953), pp. 144-145 and
1 Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts 202-210 .(1951).
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D. Judicial Interpretation
The Federal Constitutional Court wasted no time in spelling out the
meaning of these provisions. Decisions interpreting Article 21, together with
related cases involving electoral law, are important both for the novel juridical
theories that they embody and for their impact on West German politics. It
is not our intent here to embark upon a lengthy discussion of every case that
has arisen under Article 21 but simply to articulate the general principles that
have governed the Court's attitude toward the role of political parties in West
Germany."1The Basic Law differs from the German constitutions of 1871 and 1919 in
that it makes specific reference to the role of political parties. Under the
monarchy and the republic both jurisprudence and political science were
heavily influenced by the analytical distinction between state and society that
Germans were fond of making. What belonged to the order of the state was
ipso facto excluded from the order of society. Since political parties, like other
interest groups, were a manifestation mainly of social relations they could not
juridically be regarded as components of the state. As we shall soon see in our
discussion of the party finance case this distinction has not wholly lost its force
in German constitutional theory.
Yet the Federal Constitutional Court regards the political system under the
Basic Law as a "party-state" or Parteienstaat. Political parties, within the
meaning of Article 21, are not simply social formations; they are also elements
of constitutional structure and actually carry out the functions of a constitu-
tional organ. An open system of competitive political parties, suggests the
Court, is implicit in the very concept of the liberal democracy that the Basic
Law purports to create. Parties are constituent units of liberal democracy
mainly because of their participation in shaping the political will of the people
(politischen Willensbildung des Volkes). It is in this sense that parties are
ultimately to be distinguished from other associations of citizens; for parties
seek to influence and shape the people's will for the purpose of ruling the
entire society. 12
What therefore makes parties so critical to German democracy is that they
have the. fundamental responsibility of organizing the electorate in such a way
as to secure the expression of a political will capable of directing the organs
11 Annotations on Article 21 are included in Gerhard Leibholz and H. J. Rinck, Grund-
gesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Cologne and Marienburg: Verlag Dr. Otto
Schmidt KG, 1966), pp. 273-288. See also Heinz Laufer, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und
Politischer Prozess (Tilbingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1968), pp. 479-550.
12 These principles were defined mainly in three early decisions of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. See I BVerfGE 208, 223-228 (1952); 2 BVerfGE 1, 1-79 (1953); and 5
BVerfGE 85, 133-147 (1956).
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of the state. Government in effect is powered by the will of the political com-
munity. Indeed the very legitimacy of German democracy, again from the
point of view of constitutional theory, is contingent upon the realization and
identification of the people's political will. The principle of popular sovereignty
commands no less than that the will of the state reflect the will of the people.
But the will of the people must be formed before it can be discovered or ex-
pressed and, a fortiorari, before a democratic government can be licensed, as
it were, to rule. This process takes place primarily in parliamentary elections.'$
The Court has come near to suggesting that it is constitutionally imperative
that parties play a meaningful educative role within the political system. Oc-
casionally the Court seems to be saying that if parties do not function in this
way-that is, if they do not offer the voting public a coherent program of
political action on the basis of which voters can make a rational choice among
policy alternatives--they cannot be regarded as parties within the meaning
of Article 21.14 Though the Court has not made the point in so many
words, one rather clear implication of this view is that a party which lacks a
well-defined policy orientation might be barred from competing in elections.
For to allow any electoral grouping,, no matter how ephemeral or narrow its
interests, to compete at the polls would defeat the very purpose of the
Parteienstaat whose intent is to inject a measure of rationality into the electoral
process. One might suggest that on this view political parties based primarily
on charisma or other nonrational factors could be banned from electoral com-
petition without doing violence to the principle of liberal democracy. Perhaps
there is an element of paternalism in the notion that voters should be protected
against the frivolous exercise of the franchise. In any case, the German Court
13 Ibid.
4 To be regarded as a party within the meaning of Article 21 a political group must
also have an organization or structure, possess a membership list, and actually compete in
elections. Of course the most obvious criterion for determining whether a political grouping
is a political party under the Basic Law is whether it has representatives in Parliament.
But supposing a group does not have such representation. How detailed or specific must
these criteria be for a group to qualify as a party? On this point the Court has hedged,
preferring to remain open and flexible on the matter, saying little more than that a group's
longevity, continuity, and membership strength would probably determine party status.
These criteria are important because they affect the right of political groups not only to
secure ballot positions in state and federal elections but also to achieve standing in the
Federal Constitutional Court should their rights as corporate units of the political system
be infringed. A political party's access to the Federal Constitutional Court is severely
limited, and has been a source of some dispute within the Court itself. Parties do not, like
ordinary citizens, corporations, or other private groups, have the right to file constitutional
complaints with the Federal Constitutional Court. Parties may bring suits only under the
Court's so-called Organstreit jurisdiction. That is, a party must claim that its rights as an
organ of the state have been infringed to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. Inasmuch as
parties are so regarded only for electoral purposes, this limits the situations under which
parties may go before the Court. See generally Gerhard Leibholz and Reinhard Rupprecht,
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (Cologne and Marienburg: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG,
1968), p. 34.
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has come closer than any other constitutional tribunal to incorporating the
modem theory of responsible party government into its constitutional law. 1 5
Because party competition is regarded as so essential to German democracy
the Federal Constitutional Court has closely scrutinized all regulations alleged
to impinge on this process. This posture of judicial activism with respect to
legislation involving electoral matters goes back to the Court's first term when
it nullified a Schleswig-Holstein statute that required a party to poll, for
purposes of proportional representation in the state legislature, seven-and-a-
half percent of the total vote. 1 6 Both federal and state quotas of five percent,
however, have been upheld as a reasonable and legitimate means of promoting
political stability by discouraging the emergence of splinter parties. 17 The
Court has ruled also that no party can validly be denied, under the equality
principle of Article 3, radio or television time advertising during election cam-
paigns, although the length of time allocated for such purposes may be tailored
to the importance and strength of the party in the community.' 8 On another
occasion the Court actually ordered new elections in a Saarland community
after a local citizens group was denied the right to file a candidates' list in a
district election pursuant to a law which reserved this right to political
parties. 19 A similar statute of North Rhine-Westphalia was also invalidated,
along with a Lower Saxony statute that required a person to secure a relatively
high number of signatures on a petition before he could become a candidate
for a municipal or district election. 20
These decisions, however, do not imply, as suggested earlier, that every
group or any individual is constitutionally entitled to run in an election. A
limited number of signatures may be required to show that a political group
has a stable following in a local community and is really representing interests
that might otherwise go unrepresented. Generally, though, the Court has
actively sought to protect the democratic character of the electoral process. In
doing so it seems to have established a workable balance between the compet-
ing values involved in all these cases. On the one hand, it has approved min-
imal threshold restrictions on candidate qualification and legislative representa-
15 See Gerhard Leibholz, "Parteien und Wahlrecht in der Modernen Demokratie,"
Parteien, Wahlrecht, Demokratie (Cologne and Opladen: West Deutscher Verlag, 1967),
pp. 40-60. For American views of this subject see Committee on Political Parties of the
American Political Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System
(1950); E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1960); and Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government:
Its Origin and Present State (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954).
16 1 BVerfGE 208 (1952).
176 BVerfGE 104 (1957), 6 BVerfGE 99 (1957), and 6 BVerfGE 84 (1957).
18 14 BVerfGE 132 (1963).
29 11 BVerfGE 266 (1961).
20 11 BVerfGE 351 (1961) and 12 BVerfGE 9 (1962).
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tion to keep the political system from flying apart; on the other, it has in-
validated electoral impediments which unreasonably thwart dissent or place
emerging parties or electoral associations at a competitive disadvantage vis-U-vis
the established parties.2 '
West Germay's regime of political parties is not, however, wholly an open
system, as paragraph 2 of Article 21 makes clear, for it introduces the concept
of an "unconstitutional party." Bonn's democracy does not, like Weimar's
republic, assume a posture of neutrality toward political parties. Bonn, ac-
cording to the Federal Constitutional Court, is a "fighting democracy"
ordained to protect and safeguard the democratic principles on which the
Basic Law is founded.2 2 Political parties which reject the highest values of the
constitutional system are unconstitutional. So far, only two parties have been
declared unconstitutional by the Court: the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in
1952 and the Communist Party in 1956.23 In sharp contrast to American
theory no substantial, clear, or present danger is required as a standard for
determining the unconstitutionality of such parties; the sole question before the
Court in these cases is whether the party is totalitarian in character or whether
the aim or intent of the party is to subvert the existing political system.24
IM. COMPETING VIEWS OF THE "PARTEIENSTAAT"
The Federal Constitutional Court's decisions under Article 21 of the Basic
Law have been the object of sturdy debate among West German lawyers and
legal scholars. It is not at all certain that these decisions enjoy the support of
West German political leaders. Clearly, the decisions which occasioned the
harshest criticism of the Court were the party finance cases. Much of the criti-
cism was not wholly without warrant, however. The American legal scholar
immersed in the pragmatic jurisprudence of his own country would find these
decisions perplexing insofar as they seek to adjust the modem notion of
Parteienstaat to the older theories of political representation discussed earlier.
Some of the concepts employed in these decisions are difficult to reconcile with
political reality, though part of the problem stems from the language of the
Basic Law itself.
21 See Hans Kutscher, "Judicial Review of Supreme Courts and the Principle of Equality
under the Law," 9 Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts 197-201 (1960).
22 5 BVerfGE 139 (1956).
23 The Socialist Reich Party was declared unconstitutional in the Decition of October 23,
1952, 2 BVerfGE 1-79 (1953); the Communist Party was so declared in the Decision of
August 17, 1956, 5 BVerfGE 85-393 (1956).
24 For an excellent discussion of the Communist Party case see Edward McWhinney,
"The German Federal Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision," 32 Indiana
Law Journal 295-312 (1957).
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A good example is the Article 21 concept of "political will of the people."
The proposition that the people as a whole have a will has an ominous ring to
it, particularly when the idea of people or Volk is merged with the idea of the
state. Quite apart from the implication these notions have for democratic
theory it is sufficient for our purpose to point out that the use of abstract con-
cepts like "people" and "state" pervades German scholarly writing on the
subject of parties. As the German notion of Staatswissenschaft might suggest,
this approach tends to be formal and conceptualistic, resistant to the utilization
of experimental or empirical methods of inquiry.
There is also a latent tendency in contemporary German jurisprudence to
regard the state as a transcendent reality rather than as a complex political
system of interrelated parts and interacting forces inside and outside the formal
structure of government. The influence of Hegelian thought is.still very much
manifested by the dichotomization of society and state, politics and administra-
tion, and legal and social order. Apparently there lingers both in German
theory and among Germans generally an aversion to partisan conflict, a
repugnance for power struggles among vested interests, and a distaste for
individual political activism. To the German public mind conflict among men,
interests, and parties all too frequently represents the debilitating spirit of
Weimar. By contrast, the beauty and virtue of the state is attributable to its
nonpartisan character, its moral authority, its representation of unity, its
embodiment of the rule of law, and its competence in public affairs. This was
the glory of Imperial Germany.2 5
The analytical distinction between the realm of politics and the realm of
the state seems to have influenced the development of the constitutional idea
of Parteienstaat. Actually, two views of the party state are currently competing
for supremacy in contemporary German constitutional law. These views will
be elaborated before proceeding to a consideration of the party finance cases.
One view is represented by Professor Gerhard Leibholz, a Justice of the
Federal Constitutional Court since 1951 and unquestionably West Germany's
leading theoretician of the Parteienstaat. Though Justice Leibholz has oc-
casioned a large amount of controversy inside and outside the Court, his in-
fluence in constitutional disputes dealing with political parties and elections
has been very substantial. He proceeds from several suppositions concerning
the nature of modem democracy.
Justice Leibholz distinguishes between what he calls "'parliamentary repre-
sentative democracy" and "parliamentary political party mass democracy."
The former, based on suffrage and representative in character-the classical
25 See Railf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), chap. 13, pp. 197-213.
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19th-century liberal model of democratic government-is a system ordained
primarily for the protection of individual rights, mainly economic rights, and of
the constitutional framework within which these rights are exercised. Society is
perceived atomistically with representation being largely virtual, since there
exists no basis of social unity in terms of which to formulate legislation. Be-
cause of lack of any organizing principle of politics common interests are
sacrificed to private interests. Thus a wedge is driven between state and
society. As Justice Leibholz notes, "the danger arises when economic society
comes into conflict with the political community and prevents it from being a
community." 2 6
"Parliamentary political party mass democracy," on the other hand,
implies universal suffrage and is actually a species of plebiscitary democracy.
The Parteienstaat assumes absolute equality in voting-as Leibholz unequivo-
cally puts it, "radikale arithmatisch-mathenatische Gleichheit."27 To this
extent he is in full accord with the one-man one-vote principle enunciated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the apportionment cases. But this is only the first
step to genuine popular democracy and in this sense Justice Leibholz is more
realistic than are his counterparts on the American Supreme Court. For
numerical equality in voting is insufficient to accord just representation to the
general will of the community. Article 21 of the Basic Law requires, in ad-
dition to numerical equality in voting, effective equality of representation. In
Justice Leibholz's view this is achieved only through a multiparty system;
what is more, the system requires a certain kind of political party, namely a
unified program-oriented organization of active citizens capable of forming
the political will of the people. Edmund Burke's definition of a political party
as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national
interests upon some particular principle on which they are all agreed" seems
implied in this view. Thus parties cannot be allowed to become the tools or
the handmaidens of special interest groups. The Parteienstaat, by definition,
excludes the Verbiindestaat, a system in which interest groups monopolize the
political process. The Federal Constitutional Court's Decision of June 24,
1958, disallowing tax deductions to corporations for their contributions to
political parties was based partially on this supposition. Justice Leibholz is
most emphatically in the tradition of those European critics who have found
little to admire in the interest-oriented oligarchies of American parties that
Ostrogorski described so well in his classic treatise on that subject.2 8 It is
26 Gerhard Leibholz, Politics and Law (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1965); p. 59.
27 See Leibholz, "Parteien und Wahlrecht," pp. 40-60.
28 See Moisei L. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System in the United States (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1910), esp. pp. 225-281.
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indeed fair to say that Justice Leibholz is one of West Germany's leading in-
tellectual adversaries of an interest group theory of politics.
Now all of this involves certain consequences for the political system. First,
an electoral structure is needed which will produce political parties broadly
representative of the popular will, one that does not attenuate legitimate opinion
clusters with substantial support in the community. While acknowledging
that a two-party single-member constituency system has the special virtue of
facilitating political decision and promoting governmental stability, Justice
Leibholz nevertheless believes that the notion of just representation under the
Basic Law requires at least a modified form of proportional representation. The
combination of proportional representation with the single-member plurality
voting system in the ruling electoral law of West Germany would seem to meet
this need. Second, a close nexus between political parties and the state is
required, for the Parteienstaat governs through parties. It implies the primacy
of the party system. Should it become necessary this may even imply an obliga-
tion on the part of the state to insure that parties freely carry out the constitu-
tional function mandated by Article 21. Thus political parties are fully con-
stitutional organs within the meaning of the Basic Law and integral to the
very organization of the state.2 9
The competing view is closer to the traditional German theory. While
accepting the proposition that parties are necessary agencies of modern de-
mocracy and that Article 21 looks toward the creation of a Parteienstaat, this
view does not postulate the fundamentality of parties in any constitutional
sense. Under this interpretation political parties are chiefly voluntary associa-
tions with deep roots in-the sociopolitical structure of the community. As
such they can be regarded neither as permanent constitutional organs nor as
integral parts of the state.
This view draws an even sharper distinction between the will of the people
and the will of the state. The main responsibility of parties is to shape the will
of the people in their capacity as electoral organizations. Indubitably this helps
to shape the will of the state. Yet parties do not and may not monopolize this
process. For the will of the state must remain open to the influence of all sorts
29 Justice Leibholz has explained these views more fully in numerous publications. Among
them are "Der Parteienstaat des Bonner Grundgesetz," 66 Deutsches Verwaltungsblaat 1-8
(1951); Strukturprobleme der Modernen Demokratie (Karlsruhe: Verlag C. F. Miller,
1967), esp. pp. 71-77; Ds Wesen der Reprfisentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie
in 20. jahrhundert (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966); and Politics and Law, pp. 24-71.
A further defense of these views is contained in Hans-Justus Rinck, "Der Verfassungs-
rechtliche Status der Politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik" in Karl Dietrich Bracher
el al., Die moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht (Tilbingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck],
1966), II, 305-330. An excellent analysis of Leibholz's position is contained in Konrad
Ammermifler, Das Proportionalwahlverfahren in moderne Parteienstaat (doctoral disser-
tation, University of Cologne, 1966), pp. 10-38.
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of interests and groups outside of parties. Although it is inconceivable that a
democratic electoral process would function adequately without parties, the
claims of parties are inherently no more superior than the claims of other non-
governmental groups or interests in society. Ultimately this is the meaning
of the free political process that is required by the rights of free speech and
association under the Basic Law. 30
Furthermore, Article 21 must be read alongside of Article 38 which
provides that legislators are representatives of the whole people. Justice
Leibholz, incidentally, regards these two provisions as incompatible. In fact,
the attraction of the "party delegate" theory of representation has led some
party officials to suggest that Article 38 be repealed.3 1 But one could argue
that Article 20 of the Basic Law also qualifies any such "party delegate" theory
that might be read into Article 21. It provides: "All state authority emanates
from the people. It is exercised by the people by means of elections and voting
and by separate legislative, executive, and judicial organs." This might be
taken to imply that constitutionally the responsibility for making public policy
is not exclusively to reside in party councils.
It is interesting to note that elements of both views inhere in German con-
stitutional law. And both present conceptual difficulties that are not easily
resolved. One wonders, for example, whether the distinction between "will of
the people" and "will of the state" is analytically useful for determining com-
plex constitutional disputes arising under Article 21. Is the distinction, con-
tained in both views of the Parteienstaat, operationally viable? Is the idea of
"will" susceptible to orderly investigation outside of the heavenly world of
jurisprudence? What role does majority rule, conceived in terms of a voting
majority, play in these calculations and how does it fit into the scheme of
West German democracy? How does majority rule become operable in the
multiparty system subsumed into Justice Leibholz's concept of Parteienstaat?
How are people actually represented in large modem nation-states such as
West Germany? Can there be effective representation of people within govern-
ment? For that matter who are the "people"? In short, who really is repre-
sented?
It is not our purpose to pursue these queries here, but only to point out that,
they have not been very satisfactorily resolved by the Federal Consdtutional
Court in decisions relevant to the role of parties. Concepts such as "will,"
"state," "representation," and "people" still remain largely unexamined. Th-ey
50 This was the prevailing jurisprudential view of the proper relationship between parties
and the state during the Weimar Republic. It is in fact still the conventional argument
put forth in many contemporary German treatises on German constitutionalism. For a dis-
cussion of and citations to this literature see Laufer, pp. 480-485.
s' See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 10, 1970.
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were probably examined closer than ever before in the party finance cases.
Even so these concepts were employed there in ways that raise as many ques-
tions as they resolve. On the other hand, is it asking too much of the judicial
process to demand that the Federal Constitutional Court answer these queries
to the satisfaction of the purist who insists that every conceptual category be
specified in terms of its empirical referents? Perhaps the questions raised above
cannot by fully answered if the Court is not to abdicate responsibilities ac-
corded to it under the Basic Law. Then again perhaps they need not be
answered. Legal fictions may be useful in assisting courts to resolve constitu-
tional disputes requiring tough choices between competing values. The remak-
ing of history by the U.S. Supreme Court may very well have served this
function on occasion in American constitutional law.32
IV. THE PARTY FINANCE CASES
All of these questions and considerations converge in the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's decision of July 19, 1966, commonly known as the party finance
case. But the case cannot really be withdrawn from its proper socio-political
context, anymore than Marbury v. Madison (1803) can be appreciated apart
from the American political struggle out of which it arose. The legal context
or constitutional setting of the case has already been described in detail, except
for the income tax law case of 1958 that helped to generate the problem of
party finance in West Germany. It will be discussed below.
A. The Socio-Political Setting
The civic culture of Germany has been largely one of low public par-
ticipation in political affairs. Germany's tradition of parliamentary govern-
ment has not been particularly strong. The driving spirit of German politics
has been more authoritarian than democratic. Governmental affairs in
Germany have generally been regarded as the special preserve of an elite
trained for public administration in the service of the state. After the ex-
perience of the Third Reich, which actually deepened the apoliticism of the
German people, the Founding Fathers of the Bonn Republic sought to institute
a regime of political parties. It was hoped that such a regime, when joined to
constitutional safeguards designed to obviate the crisis that befell Weimar,
would invite the loyalties of the electorate and advance the democratization of
German political life. To say this, however, is to beg questions with which
32 See, for example, the opinions of Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan in
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
DONALD P. KOMMERS
the Federal Constitutional Court continues to grope. What kind of party
system? A two-party system broadly representative of the electorate? A
multiparty system that might cleave the electorate into opposing groups?
Should parties function primarily as instruments of political integration and
socialization? Who should bear the expense of maintaining political parties?
Even if the framers' blueprints for the reconstruction of Germany's party
system had been clear it would be doubtful that the system could have been
remade according to specification. After all political parties are primarily
social formations and only secondarily creatures of law. Yet, law may guide the
evolution of party systems. If, for example, law creates single-member con-
stituencies it may promote a two-party system; if it establishes multimember
constituencies where legislative seats are distributed on the basis of proportional
representation it may lead to the proliferation of parties. Similarly, voting
laws may facilitate or hinder partisanship. Laws which provide for closed
primary elections, adopt party-column ballots, or allow straight-ticket voting
are more likely to encourage voting along party lines than laws which pre-
scribe open primaries, office-bloc ballots, and permit the cross-filing of political
candidates in the primaries of all parties. 33
In West Germany the law provides that one-half the members of the
Bundestag shall be elected in 247 single-member constituencies by plurality
vote; the other half shall be selected from party lists on the basis of propor-
tional representation.3 4 But a party must obtain at least five percent of all
votes in the nation to obtain seats under the list system.3 5 These laws, devised to
prevent the fragmentation of the electorate into splinter groups, seem largely to
have produced their intended effect. For Germany has evolved into a modified
two-party system composed mainly of Social Democrats and Christian Dem-
ocrats, with the balance of power being controlled by a much smaller group
of Free Democrats. It is interesting to note that this configuration seems
congruent with the Christian, Socialist, and Liberal ideologies that have held
sway among large sectors of the German electorate. The Federal Constitutional
Court has in fact upheld the five percent clause over equal protection objec-
83 See generally, Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (1951 trans. Barbara and Robert
North, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963) and Angus Campbell at al., The American
Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 268-276.
s4 For an authoritative commentary on West German electoral law see Karl-Heinz Seifert,
Das Bundeswahlgesetz (Berlin and Frankfurt: Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1965). An excellent
treatment in English is U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1960), pp. 17-37.
85 Originally, seats accorded to the parties in the Bundestag under proportional represen-
tation depended solely on electoral results in the states; included in a state's delegation to
the Bundestag were representatives of parties securing five percent of the votes at the state
level. The current requirement of five percent of all voters in the nation makes it far more
difficult for minor parties to secure representation at the national level.
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tions partially on the ground that it neither obscured the visibility nor hindered
the emergence of those clear and distinct opinion clusters in Germany whose
scope and durability would rightfully entitle them to representation in the
national legislature.3 6 It remains to be noted that West Germany seems.
rapidly to be heading toward a two-party system on the American model, a
conclusion that appears warranted by the demise of the Free Democrats in
the federal elections of 1969, together with their elimination from parliamen-
tary representation in Lower Saxony and Saarland and as a result of the June
14, 1970, state elections. 3 7
Equally important as law in speeding Germany toward a broad-based
two-party system was the willingness of Christian and especially Social
Democrats to shed dogma and ideology for programs of wide-ranging appeal.
Thus law dnd social change converged to give Germany two strong political
parties that now claim the allegiance of over 90 percent of the German people,
affording Germany a large measure of political stability.3 8
Yet, if it is the raison d'tre of the Parteienstaat to create or to sponsor
parties which will serve as instruments both of political education and social
integration, who actually should bear the expense of maintaining political
parties so as to enable them to perform these functions? Party members? But
suppose citizens are unable or unwilling to support the party of their choice
with voluntary contributions. What needs to be stressed in this connection is
that though Germans do vote in overwhelming numbers for the two dominant
parties the party system itself seems not to be a matter of national pride.
Party politics is still very much the object of popular misgiving in Germany.
It has been observed by close students of this matter that Germany's civic
culture combines high popular knowledge of politics with low popular esteem
for-politics. 3 9 If this be true may it be said that parties have failed as effective
instruments of political socialization, and could this failure be at least partially
attributable to lack of financial support to sustain programs of political educa-
tion on a year-round basis? Perhaps Germany is going through a transitional
stage in her political development which would temporarily warrant some
form of public support for a regime of parties. This is Justice Leibholz's main
concern. His hope is that parties will serve not only as effective electoral
36 See, for example, 6 BVerfGE 104 (1957).
87 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, June 15, 1970, p. 1.
38 See Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Change in Germany: The Federal Republic After
the 1969 Election" and Max Kaase, "Determinants of Voting Behavior in the West German
General Election of 1969" (University of Mannheim: Institut fur Sozial Wissenschaft),
papers delivered at New York Meeting of Conference Group on German Politics, Decem-
ber 11, 1969.
39 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1963), esp. pp. 89-90, 102-103.
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organizations, providing the means for peaceful transfers of power, but also
as organs of political education, overcoming popular distrust of politics
together with the apoliticism of the German people. If parties are that crucial
to the future of German democracy why should not the state intervene in
their behalf?
B. The State Income Tax Case
But how should the state intervene to support parties in performing
the role specified by Article 21? One way is through tax legislation. Thus on
December 21, 1954, the Bundestag amended, over the opposition of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), a federal income tax law making donations to
political parties by individual citizens and corporations tax deductible. 40 The
SPD-controlled state government of Hesse at once challenged the law in a
proceeding before the Federal Constitutional Court. Holding that it discrimi-
nated against those parties-notably the SPD-not favored by large contrib-
*utors, the Court invalidated the law on equal protection grounds. That the
SPD, unlike the Christian Democratic (CDU) or Free Democratic Party
(FDP), was a mass party with several hundred thousand dues-paying members
made little difference to the Court. What was controlling in the case was that
the state, in effect, subsidized some parties through tax legislation while other
parties, based mainly on a dues-paying membership, were not in the nature
of things being similarly assisted.4 1
There are dicta in the decision that clearly reflect the influence of Justice
Leibholz, who served as rapporteur in the case. Corporate donations, the
Court noted, might augment the influence of certain parties well beyond their
actual numerical strength within the electorate, and thus distort the representa-
tion of the people's will. If such contributions are allowed to pour unchecked
into party coffers, parties might well become the tools of special interest
groups. The Court is not likely, incidentally, to have ignored the magnitude
of the CDU federal election campaign a year earlier when expenditures,
especially by the CDU, dwarfed the outlay of previous elections. This observa-
tion should be bracketed with the further notation that 1957 was the first time
that Christian Democrats under Adenauer had won an absolute majority in the
Bundestag.42
Yet Justice Leibholz and his colleagues must have realized that the volume
40 The personal income tax was amended by Bundesgesetzblatt, I, p. 441; the corporate
income tax by Bundesgesetzblatt, I, p. 467.
41 See 8 BVerfGE 51 (1958).
42 Kitzinger, pp. 275-303.
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of corporate contributions to certain parties is not determined solely by tax leg-
islation. Moreover, it would have been most difficult to show that the rise
in corporate contributions to the CDU in 1957 was actually occasioned by the
tax law. In any case, the CDU has always been the favored party of big busi-
ness in West Germany and could expect corresponding support from busi-
ness.4 3 What really seemed to trouble the Court was the lack of any auditing
of party records by public officials even though Article 21 expressly states that
parties "must publicly account for the sources of their funds." Up to now the
Bundestag had passed no statute implementing this provision of the Basic Law.
What is more, the situation was aggravated by the failure of the CDU and
the FDP, in contrast to the SPD, voluntarily to publish accounts of their
campaign expenditures. There was no policing of the party financing process
and no way, therefore, to measure the link between parties and their sources
of support. Thus, toward the end of its opinion, the Court took the unconven-
tional step of suggesting the possibility of financing political parties out of
state funds, intimating that such subventions would be constitutionally valid.4 4
C. State Financing of Political Parties
The Bundestag, under the control of the Christian Democrats, proceeded
almost immediately, with FDP and, surprisingly, SPD support to implement the
Court's suggestion, as did several states within the German Federation. In
1959 the federal budget included an appropriation of five million marks to
assist the parties in fulfilling their responsibility to form the political will of
the people under Article 21 of the Basic Law. The Minister of Interior was
instructed to distribute the money in an amount proportionate to each party's
numerical strength in the Bundestag, the effect of which was to bar financial
disbursements to parties not represented in the national legislature. Under the
statute the money was turned over to the Executive Committee of each na-
tional party organization, to be spent as party officials directed, with the
proviso that a report of expenditures be filed with the Federal Court of Ac-
counts within six months after the close of the fiscal year. Thereafter, annual
appropriations to political parties became the rule, with the total federal
outlay increasing each year, climbing to DM 38 million ($9.5 million) under
the Federal Budget Law of March 18, 1965. 4 5
4- Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "German Party Finance: The CDU," 51 American Political
Science Review 369-385 (1957). See also document of the Social Democratic Party, Die
Finanzierung des Wahlkampfs 1957: Eine Untersuchung iiber die Abhangigkeit politischer
Parteien von Wirtschaftlichen Machtgruppen (Bonn, 1957).
44 8 BVerfGE 51, 62-63 (1958).
45 For a detailed description of this and subsequent laws pertaining to party finance see
20 BVerfGE 56, 57-59 (1967).
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Once again, choosing the 1965 statute as its target, the Hesse state gov-
ernment filed suit in the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the gen-
eral validity of the subsidies. This was not, however, the first challenge to the
party finance law. The All-German Party and the Bavarian Party brought
cases in 1962 and 1964 assailing the validity of the provision restricting
financial support only to those parties strong enough electorally to win seats
in the Bundestag. Both minor parties, along with the far-right National
Democratic Party (NPD), joined Hesse in oral argument before the Federal
Constitutional Court in 1966.
Without digressing too far from the Court's jurisprudence, it is of some
interest to note that this case generated intense feeling both on and off the
Court. The interpersonal dynamics among the Justices of the Second Senate,4 6
which had jurisdiction of the case, are especially noteworthy. For a time the
Justices appeared to be deadlocked in view of the Court's repeated postpone-
ment of decision day. While the case was pending Justice Leibholz, in October,
1965, delivered a lecture at the University of Wiirzburg under the title "Staat
und Verbiinde" "'The State and Interest Groups") in which he reiterated his
well-known views on the Parteienstaat, after which he proceeded to describe
the plaintiffs before the Court as an "unholy alliance of liberals and anti-
democrats" working against the party state, his implication being that liberals,
besieged by their traditional distrust of the state, were inadvertently assisting
antidemocratic parties, notably the NPD, by undermining the Bonn democracy
much as they had "conspired" to destroy the Weimar republic. 47
The remark cost him further participation in the case. For it prompted
the NPD and other petitioners before the Court formally to move for Leib-
holz's disqualification on the ground that he could not render an impartial
judgment. In a surprising judicial maneuver the Court reopened the case to
hear oral argument on this particular question. The result was Leibholz's
exclusion from the case by vote of his colleagues in the Second Senate, a
precedent clearly at variance with the common practice in other countries of
leaving such matters to the conscience of each justice.4 8 Whatever the motives
of Leibholz's colleagues, the Justices gave the impression that they were playing
politics inside the Court.
46 The Federal Constitutional Court sits in panels- of eight justices each, called senates.
What is interesting about this institutional arrangement is the fact that justices are re-
cruited to eiiher the First or the Second Senate. The jurisdiction of the senates is mutually
exclusive. For further discussion of the internal organization of the Federal Constitutional
Court see Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in' the West German
Political System" in Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus, Frontieri of Judicial Research
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969), pp. 76-80, 107-110.
47 Gerhard Leibholz, "Staat and Verbginde," Verrffentlichungen der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Heft 24 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1966), pp. 6-33.
48 The Disqualification Case was decided on March 3, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 9 (1966).
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In any case, the party finance law was invalidated shortly thereafter. CDU
and FDP officials greeted the decision with extreme disappointment, predict-
ing sharp cutbacks in their staffs and year-round activities that in recent years
had expanded because of the availability of state funds. The SPD, more
effectively organized on the broad base of a large dues-paying membership,
was not as hard hit by the decision. While leaders of the major parties
declaimed decision day as "black Tuesday" minor party officials regarded it
as a day of sunshine.
The Court declared that state subsidies in support of general party ex-
penditures, even though for the purpose of making public opinion and shaping
the political will of the people on a year-round basis, are incompatible with
both Article 21 and Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Basic Law. While ad-
mitting that the income tax case of 1958 might be interpreted to permit such
expenditures, the Court also reiterated that political parties are basically
electoral organizations whose financial resources are to be used mainly in
support of election campaigns. In an obvious compromise among conflicting
judicial views the Court went on to hold that since parties are primarily
electoral organizations the state may validly reimburse them for expenditures
consumed by a parliamentary election campaign. The result is that public
funds may be used only to defray campaign costs. 4 9
The reasoning of the Court represents a rather uncomplicated image of the
political process. The Court begins with the old distinction between the will
of the people and the will of the state. State authority emanates from the
people, according to Article 20, and "is exercised by the people by means of
elections and voting and by separate legislative, executive, and judicial
organs." Article 21, on the other hand, is concerned with organizing the will
of the people, the main responsibility of political parties. But political parties
are not ordinarily to be regarded as constitutional "organs" within the mean-
ing of Article 20. They do serve as constitutional organs, but only at election
time when the double process of forming the will of the people and will of the
state merges in complete unity. At this point in time parties are engaged in the
vital public function expressly sanctioned by the Basic Law. When shaping
the political will of the people at other times political parties are not, in con-
trast to Justice Leibholz's view, to be regarded as performing the function of
a constitutional organ. For then they are engaged in the opinion-making busi-
ness much as any other political group. The general right to influence public
opinion, emphasized the Court, is protected by the free speech provisions of
49 See Decision of July 19, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 56 (1967). My translation of the party
finance case appears in Theodore L. Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1970), pp. 269-280.
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the Constitution. Thus the opinion-formation or will-making process must
remain completely open and unregimented. Any intrusion or infringement of
this process violates the free speech imperatives of the liberal democratic state.
State financing of political parties does just that. It gives the state leverage
over the organization of public opinion that could undermine the principle of
popular sovereignty and lead to the destruction of liberal democracy. The will
of the state must be derived from the will of the people. State financing of
political parties is tantamount to an unconstitutional inversion of this process.
In so ruling the Court rejected certain components of the Leibholz theory
of Parteienstaat. The constitutional role accorded to political parties under the
Basic Law does not imply state funding in support of this role. In an obvious
rebuff to Justice Leibholz the Court said: "This argument implies doubts
about the capacity and readiness of the ordinary citizen voluntarily to support
party organizations and to render them effective instruments of political ex-
pression." Parties thus are fundamentally voluntary associations. State fund-
ing on a yearly or monthly basis, said the Court, "would not actually transform
the parties into state institutions, but would force them across the boundary
separating state from non-state institutions." It is not the responsibility of the
state either to see to the financial needs of political parties or even to use the
power of the purse to balance the competitive position of parties seeking to
shape the will of the electorate. 50
In support of the federal finance law the three parties represented in the
Bundestag argued that allocations under the law were essentially no different
from many other kinds of subventions. Examples raised included: appropria-
tions for the public relations activities' of governmental agencies; stipends and
allowances to individual members of parliament; allocations to party factions
within the Bundestag; and grants-in-aid to certain nongovernmental social,
professional, and cultural groups.
The Court rejected all these analogies. First, the public relations work of
government agencies falls into a different category because it is informational
in nature, seeking objectively to explain public policies and programs. Second,
legislators are state officials; hence, allowances for their daily support are
needed actually to secure their freedom of decision and independence. Third,
parliamentary factions are entitled to state support because they are constit-
uent units of the Bundestag, not because they are parliamentary arms of
political parties. Last, grants to social, economic, and cultural groups are for
nonpolitical purposes that the state recognizes as worthy of'public support.
The Court also rejected as spurious the distinction drawn by SPD lawyers
5o Becker, pp. 272-273.
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between funds allocated for purposes of political education and those allocated
for purposes of political propaganda.
After delving into the constitutional history of Article 21 the Court con-
duded that the framers, while emphatically subscribing to the concept of
Parteienstaat, did not envision the kind of nexus between party and state that
such financial support would create. The principal objective of the framers in
writing Article 21, said the Court, was to maintain a free and competitive
party system, which was to be accomplished mainly by a proscription of anti-
democratic parties along with the requirement of disclosure of party finances.
Recalling the experience of the Nazi period the Court said:
The authors of the Basic Law, emphatically rejecting the ruling system
of the National Socialists, anchored the legitimacy of parties in the newly
created parliamentary democracy. At the same time, mindful of develop-
ments under National Socialism, the support it received from wealthy
industrialists, and the destruction of all party competition in 1933, the
authors of the Basic Law sought to adopt measures which would guarantee
the security of liberal democracy. This purpose is served not only by
Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Basic Law concerning the unconstitution-
ality of certain parties, but also by the provision that the internal organiza-
tion of parties correspond to democratic principles and that the parties
should give a public accounting of the origin of their finances. Only in
the interest of securing the liberal democratic basic order did the framers
impose these limitations upon the freedom of parties. Finally, the framers
looked decisively toward a model of parties openly competitive and in-
dependent of the state in every regard, much as had been the case under
the Weimar Constitution. 5 '
Yet the Court went on to rule that public support of political parties would
be permissible during an election campaign. "The special importance that
parties have for voters," the Court noted, "constitutionally justifies state financ-
ing of those costs which are essential for the conduct of a reasonable election
campaign."
Reimbursement for such costs, however, must be limited to expenditures
directly related to an election campaign. Said the Court: "Only those specific
costs which enable the parties to present their programs, aims, and purposes
in the course of an election campaign may form the basis of computing total
election expenditures." This computation, moreover, is not to be based on the
estimates of the parties themselves; the legislature must itself formulate ob-
jective measures for determining what are appropriate election expenditures.
It remained to decide whether such subventions could constitutionally be
51 Ibid., p. 274.
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limited to political parties represented in the Bundestag. If the legislature elects
to defray the costs of an election campaign it must be in accordance with a
formula that does not offend the principle of equal opportunity. This principle
is violated when the state limits such funds to the parliamentary parties.
Hence, all parties which take part in a campaign are entitled to share in the
distribution of such funds.
The Bundestag assumed originally that the five percent clause, if valid for
purposes of parliamentary representation, would be valid as applied to party
financing. Indeed, it was calculated that public financing of political parties
had to be limited to parties in the Bundestag if the proliferation of parties was
to be avoided. The Court did not agree, for "the legislature has already taken
precautions to prevent the fragmentation of the vote and the formation of
splinter parties; it is not permissible to base the allocation of campaign funds
on whether a party has received five percent of all valid votes. This measure
would in fact double the effect of the five percent clause, and make virtually
impossible the entrance of a new party into the Parliament." 52 This did not
mean, however, that every party entering an election campaign was entitled to
identical support by the state. The Court laid down two general criteria in
terms of which the Bundestag might restrict disbursements to political parties.
First, the legislature might make disbursements contingent on a party's receiv-
ing a minimum number of votes, but this figure must be considerably below
the five percent level • required for parliamentary representation. Second, if
parties satisfy the threshold requirement, funds may be disbursed proportionate
to a party's showing at the polls or in accord with some other formula that
reasonably takes into account genuine differences between the parties.
V. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The Party Finance case did not wholly constitute a rejection of the view
that parties are constitutionally necessary instruments for the proper function-
ing of liberal democracy, though one might conclude, as did Edward
McWhinney, that the decision was a rejection of "a highly imaginative piece
of legislation that attempted to relate the extraordinary cost of election ex-
penses in the modern democratic state to the political reality that, if there is
not to be a form of public subvention on a politically impartial basis, then the
political parties will inevitably become dependent upon and subject to possible
undesirable pressures from their principal financial donors." 53"
52 Ibid., p. 280.
53 Edward McWhinney, "Federal Supreme Courts and Constitutional Review," 47 Cana-
dian Bar Review 596 (1967).
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To some of the Court's critics the Party Finance case revived the tradi-
tional distinction between state and society which, while perhaps analytically
sound, is useless as a measure by which to calibrate deviations from a free
electoral process. 54 Yet to the Court this case was not exactly an exercise in
conceptual jurisprudence. The Court was faced with a genuine clash of con-
stitutional norms and judicial views. Some justices were against all financing
of political parties out of state funds. Others were prepared to uphold the
law so long as minor parties were not excluded from its benefits. This was
Justice Leibholz's position; though he would have approved the principle of
all-purpose financing he would have rejected the statute's discriminatory
provisions. Still other justices were quite prepared to accept the law as it stood.
Achieving a single position supported by a majority of the Court was not to be
easily achieved in these circumstances.
Maneuvering inside the Court, particularly Justice Leibholz's disqualifica-
tion from the case, should not obscure the fact that both sides of the con-
troversy could draw heavily on German political experience for support. On
the one hand, the justices were too astute to be lulled into the belief that
public financing of established parties on the massive scale provided by the
1965 statute might not impinge upon the independence of parties or, equally
objectionable from their point of view, solidify the status quo in such a way
as to strangle incipient though legitimate political movements. They might
also have argued that state subsidies would reinforce the power of party oligar-
chies, induce laxity in the recruitment of new members, halt the expansion of
the party's base of support in the electorate, and thus undermine the purpose
of Article 21. On the other hand, these considerations had to be balanced
against the equally cogent argument mentioned above by McWhinney, to-
gether with the view that party financing without discrimination might frac-
tionalize the political community and undermine governmental stability.
By any standard this was a difficult case and, as frequently asserted, dif-
ficult cases do not make very good law. Out of this welter of competing values
and policy alternatives the Court managed to formulate a constitutional rule;
a rule which, when all is said and done, contains a good deal of practical
wisdom. Though sure to generate problems for politicians the rule did seem
to strike a reasonable balance between the two opposing views of Parteienstaat
discussed earlier in this paper.
The immediate effect of the decision was to throw the whole question of
party finance back to parliament. But the party finance case would not be the
first instance in which a constitutional tribunal has in effect said to the leg-
islative branch: "We have decided. Now you work out the details." Some
54 See Laufer, pp. 512-534.
DONALD P. KOMMERS
of the loose ends left untied by the Court in this case were: What is a "cam-
paign" within the meaning of the decision? When does a campaign begin?
End? Is campaigning a seasonal activity or a perpetual preoccupation? The
Court seemed to intimate that "proper campaign expenditures" would include
only those costs incurred in a campaign during an election year. For purposes
of calculating which campaign expenditures are "proper"-that is, constitu-
tional-campaign costs would have to be separated from other kinds of costs
incurred by parties.
The Federal Constitutional Court's decision prompted the Bundestag to act
almost immediately if public funding of political parties was to be restored.
The parties ensconced in the Bundestag were not about to return exclusively
to private sources of funding after feeding at the public trough for six years.
Despite the fact that for sixteen years various interior ministers had pressed
futilely for a general law on political parties to enforce the reporting, disclosure,
and other provisions of Article 21, all three parties--the CDU/CSU, SPD,
and FDP-on their own initiative introduced a comprehensive bill on parties
that passed by an overwhelming majority.5 5 Approved by the Bundesrat, it
became law on July 27, 1967.56 Besides provisions for reimbursing the parties
for the cost of election campaigns, the Parties Law of 1967 contains detailed
provisions relating to the i ) constitutional status and function of parties,
2) party organization and programs, 3) nomination of candidates, 4) rights
of party members, and 5) unconstitutional parties and enforcement of their
prohibition. The act was carefully drawn to avoid the classifications and
discriminations that spelled nullification for so many state and federal laws
impinging on the electoral process in the past. What the Bundestag did in
effect was to codify many of the principles and rules laid down by the Federal
Constitutional Court in numerous decisions since 1951. This was one of the
more important by-products of the party finance case.
The finance provisions of the statute have already generated considerable
litigation in the Federal Constitutional Court, all of the cases so far having
been filed by minor parties outside of parliament objecting on constitutional
grounds to the formulae and procedures by which parties are reimbursed for
their campaign expenditures. 5 7 It is not yet clear which among the three
major parties will benefit most from the Parties Law or, if such benefits do
result, whether the disadvantaged parties would be able to claim a denial of
55 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 5. Wahlperiode, 116. 'Sitzung (June 28,
1967), p. 5813.
56 See "Gesetz fiber die politischen Parteien yom July 24, 1967," Bundesgesetzblatt, I,
773-781.
57 On. this general question see Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Public Subsidization in West
Germany and the U.S.," 16 Jahrbuch des 6 entlichen Rechts 367-378 (1967).
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equal protection. 58 Though the Court has up to now sustained the validity
of the Law's provisions it has made indisputably clear its intention to care-
fully examine all complaints of unequal treatment that may arise under the
statute.
The Parties Law of 1967 closes the first chapter of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's jurisprudence under Article 21. It is a record that rivals that
of the United States Supreme Court in its role as guardian of the electoral
process. It is worth noting here in conclusion that the Federal Constitutional
Court's decisions in the 1950's actually anticipated the Supreme Court's
reversal of its policy beginning with Baker v. Carr,59 to remain aloof from a>-
* portionment controversies. Whether the Supreme Court would follow a policy
of abstention in the event that Congress were to pass a law similar to the
German statute is hard to say. Yet in William v. Rhodes,60 the ramifications of
which Chief Justice Warren-in dissent-feared would be comparable to
those of Baker, the Supreme Court touched on many of the problems that
worried the German justices in the party finance case. In Williams, decided on
October 15, 1968, the Supreme Court nullified Ohio laws that had the effect
of keeping Governor George Wallace's American Independent Party off the
presidential ballot, over the objection that it was within the state's power to
pass reasonable regulations devised to maintain a two-party system, facilitating
electoral choice, and thus to promote political stability. There are of course
those who see something ominous in the likelihood that the judiciary may
have given a boost to right-wing extremist movements in both countries. Yet,
it is surely some cause for wonder that the top constitutional tribunals of two of
the West's most powerful democracies have deemed it necessary to exert
judicial power in support of minor parties, no matter what political philosophy
they embody.
For Germany the Federal Constitutional Court's role is all the more re-
markable in view of that country's past history, along with the erstwhile
5s 24 BVerfGE 300 (1969) and 24 BVerfGE 363 (1969). The formula on which public
subsidies are granted is based on the 1965 federal e'ection. Total election cost computed
for that year was DM 95 million ($24 million). This sum was divided by the number of
eligible voters estimated to have been around 38.5 million. The sum per voter was thus
fixed at DM 2,50 or approximately 63 cents per voter. The reimbursement fund for the
1969 federal election, with nearly 39 million eligible voters, would therefore amount to
around DM 100 million. Parties receiving at least 2.5 percent of all votes cast are eligible
to receive reimbursement proportionate to their electoral support. The law also provides
that parties may receive payments up to a certain amount in advance of the federal election,
but not in excess of 60 percent of the total fund. Installments are granted beginning with
the second year following an election.
59 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The best and most recent treatment of the Supreme Court's
role in the electoral process is Richard Claude, The Supreme Court and the Electoral
Process (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
60 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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quiescence and conservatism of the German judiciary. What is more, the
German Court's decisions have been heeded, and this would seem to bode well
for the future of constitutional government in West Germany. It is, of course,
true that no judicial tribunal can create a regime of parties that some members
of the German Court seem to think is the quintessence of a constitutional
democracy. This only Germans themselves can do. So long as the German
people strive to create a working democracy and to build a truly competitive
party system the Federal Constitutional Court, as this paper has tried to show,
can help to insure that the political process will be harnessed to serve the broad
purposes of the Basic Law.
